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Abstract
The present paper investigates the effect of the revolution occurred in January 2011
in Egypt on the Preferences of Redistribution. This shock has been an important event
enhancing the freedom situation and political structure. In a first step taking into account
the main determinants explaining Preferences of Redistribution displayed in literature,
our results differ showing a positive impact of the religion and a negative impact of the
altruistic attitude. In a second step, we rely on a diff-in-diff approach to estimate the
effect of the revolution using as control group three similar countries. We find that Egyp-
tians became much more favorable to redistribution after the Arab Spring. Moreover, the
revolution effect is stronger for the poorest people and those who are interested in politics.
JEL Classification: H23, D74.
Keywords: Redistributive preferences, Revolution, Arab spring, Freedom, Political situ-
ation.
1 Introduction
As shown in the world inequality report (W.I.R) the income inequality measured by the con-
centration of income in the hands of the wealthiest 10% has increased since 1980 in nearly
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all world regions (Alvaredo, Chancel, Piketty, Saez, and Zucman (2018)). Understanding the
determinants of the preferences for redistribution presents a key topic in the fight against these
inequalities. Many motivations drive this attitude as explained by many scholars (Fong, 2001;
Corneo and Grüner, 2002; Alesina and Giuliano, 2009). One of the interest aspects in this topic
is the political regime under which individuals can express their preferences (Acemoglu, Naidu,
Restrepo, and Robinson (2015)). Schläpfer, Schmitt, and Roschewitz (2008) showed how the
preferences of citizens could be influenced by political institutions, Kymlicka (2004) in turn
stresses the importance of the political liberties in the individual economic attitudes.
In this paper, we are interested in the possible impact of a change in the political regime
and in the level of political and informational freedom on the preferences for redistribution,
with an application in the case of the Egyptian Revolution. The 25 January revolution which
belongs to the Arab Spring, has been an important part of a revolutionary wave where many
democratic ideas were spreading. This wave started on 17 December 2010 in Tunisia and has
been spread in different forms in many Arab countries like Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Morocco,
Jordan and Lebanon. In Egypt, where the most popular slogan was "Bread, Freedom, Social
Justice", the revolution succeed, the political regime changed and many shifts occurred at the
freedom and political levels. Between 2011 and the first half of 2012 a lot of new political
parties were created, and many elections were held. If we look to the evolution of the attitudes
towards redistribution between 2008 and 2012 in Egypt in Figure 1, we see that the distribution
of the variable presenting the demand for redistribution increased drastically between the two
periods. Based on World Values Survey (WVS) data, 22% of the Egyptian population was
in favor of the redistribution in 2008, this percentage rose to 59 % in 2012 (Table 2). This
evolution not only impacted the poor people but also the rich: for people belonging to the first
quintile (the poorest), this percentage increased by 46%, and for people belonging to the fifth
quintile (the richest) this percentage increased by 18%.
Individual preferences for redistribution change over time for many reasons, some are related
to personal life evolution, others are related to broader events. The subject of the evolution
of the demand for redistribution over a short period constitutes one of the most interesting
research quests, especially when what we called a "shock" happens whose effects on the de-
mand for redistribution are anticipated. In the field of the study of the shock effect on the
redistribution attitude, Olivera (2014) and Kroeger (2014) showed how the European economic
crisis increased the support for redistribution. Margalit (2013) was interested in the American
Great recession leading to conclude that a personal economic shock like a job loss has a positive
effect on the demand for redistribution. Dahlberg, Edmark, and Lundqvist (2012) showed how
increasing the number of immigrants to Europe lead to reduce support for redistribution among
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Figure 1: Evolution of the support for redistribution in Egypt between 2008 and 2012
natives in the case of Sweden, and Brunner, Ross, and Washington (2011) studied for California
the positive economic shock and found that it reduces the support for redistribution.1 Even if
the Egyptian revolution is considered as "political" driven and not an as "economic" one like
those quoted above, we keep very similar methods, since it remains the effect of time which we
are interested in. A significant result for the Egyptian revolution helps us to shed new light on
the role of freedom and political offer on preferences for redistribution.
This paper is also the first, to the best of our knowledge, which study the subject of the
demand for redistribution in some Arab countries. The Arab world has some characteristics
differing it from the developed countries, where most of the researches on demand for redistri-
bution were done. In the first place, about the political situation, Arab countries are considered
until now as the most repressive regimes in the World always having the worst ranking in all
freedom components (Freedom House (2018)). Elbadawi and Makdisi (2010) talks about a
crisis of democracy in the Arab world. In the second place, the whole Arab culture structure
has many specificities notably in some important aspects like the particular place of the reli-
gion, the relation between the citizens and the government and the vital role of the charitable
organisations which would contribute to shape the social preferences differently from other well
1Dahlberg et al. (2012) explained this result by the fact that more ethnic heterogeneity lead to reduce the
demand for redistribution among natives.
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studied developed countries (Teti, Abbott, and Cavatorta (2017)). Indeed, many determinants
of the support for redistribution are related to cultural dimensions . Therefore, in our study of
the effect of revolution, it seems necessary to take stock of the structure of the determinants
of the demand for redistribution in Egypt, and therefore control the effects of these factors to
isolate the effect of the political change.
The methodology that was adopted in this paper is based on the following idea : if we
control for the maximum number of factors that could have an effect on the evolution of the
demand for redistribution, the remaining effect of the period between 2008 and 2012 can be
considered as the effect of the "political re-foundation" in Egypt. We use in the same line a
difference-in-difference approach for the effect of time concerning 3 countries having similari-
ties with Egypt but did not experienced a revolution: Jordan, Morocco and Turkey. We also
apply different robustness checks to strengthen our results. Without surprise, the revolution
– and therefore the political and the freedom situation change – has a very strong positive
effect on the demand for redistribution in Egypt no matter in all the cases. In trying to find
convincing explanations binding this result to changes that occurred with the revolution, we
study the heterogeneous effect of the revolution over the economic and the political-interested
groups. We find that the most affected were the poor individuals and the groups who are the
most interested in politics. In the same regressions, we also take care of the effects of the
different factors we study in a quest to understand better what characterize Egypt and the 3
other similar countries. In general, at least for Egypt, we have big similarities with literature
results especially what relates to the self-interest factors, for example, a better financial situa-
tion decreases the support for redistribution. But we also have some particularities for which
we search explanations like the positive effect of the religion and the negative effect of being
altruist on the preference for redistribution .
The results we obtain along with the reading of the political and freedom situation, guide
our interpretation to state that the revolution – after 14 months of its outbreak – enhanced a
shift in the collective consciousness about the question of redistribution. This shift is particu-
larly strong for the poorest individuals which means that a part of this change may be related
to inequality perception matters. This shift also had a greater impact on the very interested
individuals in politics which indicates that the new political speech based in the matter of
democracy, social justice and the importance of freedom can be considered as a part of the
explanation. In fact, when the level of freedom is very low, the individual faces some inability
to make a political decision. In the field of preferences for redistribution, we suppose implicitly
that at some threshold of Freedom, individuals can have access to the necessary political and
economic information to participate in the political life and therefore know what choices they
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dispose of. It can be considered the case in most of the countries when studies about preferences
for redistribution have been lead (mainly in Europe and USA), which was by far not the case
in Egypt. In the absence of a minimum level of political and civil liberties, it becomes difficult
for individuals to decide how to lead their lives (Kymlicka (2004)). Karshenas, Moghadam,
and Alami (2014) stress the attention to the "democratic-developmental social contract" where
interest groups discuss on the social justice system, and show how the Arab spring created the
conditions for that.
By focusing on the Arab countries and especially Egypt, our study contributes to the grow-
ing literature on the determinants of preferences for redistribution by providing the first analysis
of these preferences for this region of the world. The second contribution lies in showing the
critical role of the informational and political freedom on shaping the support for redistribu-
tion. This is achieved by evaluating the effect of the Egyptian revolution on this attitude. We
underline that this phenomenon has been rarely studied because the difficulty to have data just
before and after a big event like a revolution, which is the case for Egypt.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the description of the
economic, political and freedom situation before and after the revolution. Section 3 presents
the data and the descriptive statistics concerning Egypt and some other Arab countries. In
Section 4 we posit the empirical strategy to obtain the results we are looking for. Section
5 presents all results concerning the determinants for demand for redistribution in Egypt, the
effect of revolution controlled for these factors, the differential effect of revolution, and the effect
of revolution controlled for the Arab trend. In Section 6 we provide some explanations about
why the revolution had a positive impact on preferences for redistribution. Finally, Section 7
concludes.
2 Context : Egypt before and after revolution
The revolution is a broad popular movement outside the existing constitutional structure, or
outside the legitimacy, whose aim is to change the system of government existing in the state
as was defined by Azmi Bishara in his book “Revolution and the ability to revolution” written
after Arab Spring (Bishara (2009)). According to this definition and other studies Brownlee,
Masoud, and Reynolds (2015), the Egyptian social movement was one. This revolution created
a strong conscience among Egyptians that the suffering they endure is a result of injustice and
it is not a given social situation, and that it is essential to be a free citizen involved in the
political life (Bishara (2009)). We are trying in this Section to find what factors could have
enough strength to shift the preferences of the individuals as we see for Egypt. For that, we
5
will expose the economic, political and freedom situations before and after January 2011, while
depicting essentially the consequences the revolution had on two vectors: the political life and
the freedom of information.
At the level of the economic situation, we are interested in the most important economic
indexes. If we look at the growth rate in table 4, we read that it was increasing since 2004
(The World Bank (2018))(table 4). We take an inequality indicator, the Gini index was slightly
improving as we can see in table 4. We note the same trend for the Human Development Index
HDI. In the few months directly after the revolution, as Abdou, Salman, and Zaazou (2013)
presented in their document, the economic situation was damaged, but apparently not to the
point of having an effect on people’s financial feelings. Indeed, in our data, the percentage of
individuals unsatisfied with their financial situation in 2012 compared to 2008 was almost the
same: 42% in 2008 and 44%. Costello, Jenkins, and Aly (2015) showed in their discussion on
the determinants of the Arab awakenings protests, the limited role of the economic factors on
these revolutions, and they found rather good support for the effect of the "state terror", an
important element of the freedom, which we discuss in the next paragraphs.
On the eve of the Arab Spring, the Arab world was considered as the most repressive region
in the world. Egypt was a part of this reality: from 1981 until the revolution in 2011, Egypt was
always considered one of the least free countries. Egyptians were chaired all this time by the
same person, the ex-general "Hosni Mubarak". Amnesty international (2011) criticized several
times Mubarak administration, for reasons linked to restrictions on freedom of expression and
assembly, and also for political censorship. In the political field, only one political party was re-
ally existing, the National Democratic Party (NDP), considered as a single party, authoritarian
and centrist (El-Mikawy (1999)). The emergency law was maintained during all the duration
of Mubarak presidential (Othman (2012)). Freedoms of assembly and association in 2008,
2009 and 2010 were heavily restricted (Freedom house, 2008, 2009, 2010). We also rely on ta-
ble 3 where is presented the ratings of some freedom components in these years (2008 and 2010).
On 25 January 2011, the 6 April youth movement and others opposition groups called to
protest for a day called the "Day of Anger". Demonstrations were maintained in different cities,
and the government took a set of steps to fight against it. After 16 days of demonstrations,
Hosni Mubarak Vice resigned as president. One of the characteristics of this revolution is that
it was popular, people from all social spheres participated (Bishara, 2009; Costello, Jenkins,
and Aly, 2015). One of the first claims of the Egyptian people was about restoring dignity
and get rid of the restriction of liberties (Dabashi, 2012; Telhami, 2013). This revolution was
in line with the revolutionary wave that began in Tunisia in December 2010 and stretched to
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many other Arab countries, a wave called "The Arab Spring". Nevertheless, revolutions have
succeeded only in Tunisia and Egypt. The Egyptian revolution was the beginning of a series of
changes concerning the social and political life of citizens. Years 2011, 2012 were a particular
part of the Egyptian history in term of citizen’s participation in political life and the evolution
of the freedom situation.
At first, we talk about the evolution of the political life in Egypt: after few months of the
revolution, many political parties were created with different economic and ideological pro-
grams, parties have succeeded very well in the legislative elections done in the end of 2011 and
the beginning of 2012, with the almost disappearance of the old NDP party as we can see in
table 6. In this legislative election, the turnout rate was very high (62%) compared to the 2010
legislative election (27,47% in 2010) as we can see in table 5. In 2012, for the first time in
the history in Egypt, the presidential election corresponding the global standards was done,
the turnout was also very high compared to the 2005 presidential election (51.85% in 2012 and
22.95% in 2005) (table 5). In addition, there were also one referendum and one consultative
council elections. In just two years (2011 and 2012), Egyptian citizens have participated at 3
democratic events. This year (2012) has also seen the lifted of the emergency state after 30
years. One of the most important variables we have in the database showing how the rela-
tionship of individuals has changed towards politics, is the degree of interest in politics: the
distribution of individuals over the degree of interest in politics changed sharply after the rev-
olution as we can see in Figure 2.
To show the development of the freedom situation at this level, we rely on the Human Free-
dom Index (HFI) presented in table 3: some indicators improved strongly between 2008 and
2011-2012. The freedom of association and demonstration has increased by three times from
2.5/10 to 7.5/10 (0 means no freedom at all; 10: the best freedom situation), the freedom of
assembly and the freedom to establish organizations have also rocketed. Moreover, the NGO
"Freedom house" improved the rating of Egypt’s political rights in 2012 from "Not Free" to
"Partly Free" (Vasquez and Porcnik (2016)).
At second, we talk about the evolution of the freedom of information, by notably highlight-
ing the development of the part linked to Internet. Table 3 reports the evolution of the freedom
information in Internet: the state control over Internet access has become much less influential,
from 3.3/10 to 7.5/10 (Vasquez and Porcnik (2016)). The same report also mentioned the
increasing of the number of independent television stations and the number of newspapers, and
the improvement of the Academic Freedom . These social medias were considered as the most
important platforms where citizens expressed themselves and where the political parties had
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Figure 2: Interest in Politics : Egypt
an independent tool of communication. In fact, the number of Facebook and Twitter users has
risen very strongly in the two years after the revolution (Mourtada and Salem (2011)), and
Facebook becomes the most popular search queries in Egypt (Wolfsfeld, Segev, and Sheafer
(2013)). Many authors showed the positive effect of the social media in organizing the demon-
strations and discussing news before the revolution (Lotan, Graeff, Ananny, Gaffney, Pearce,
et al. (2011),Stepanova (2011)). This effect remained present after the revolution and played
an essential role in shaping political debates, and spreading democratic ideas (Howard, Duffy,
Freelon, Hussain, Mari, and Maziad (2011)). As we can see in table 8 that the classical media
did not enjoy enough the improvement of Freedom situation, the political pressures and controls
on Media content did not change, what pushed citizens to look after social medias (Howard
et al. (2011)). Dabashi (2012) explains how news media, essentially social media with the new
Internet newspapers, helped in the circulation of knowledge of civil liberties, and how that they
were the real theorists of the Arab Spring.
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3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.1 Data
The data come from the World Values Survey data (WVS). These data consist of nationally
representative surveys conducted in almost 100 countries on six waves between 1981 and 2014.
The first wave including Arab countries was the fourth wave (1999-2014). Since we are only
interested in the change due to revolutions, we limit our interest on the wave before the Arab
Spring and the wave after, to know the wave 5 (2005-2009) and the wave 6 (2010-2014). For
Egypt, the wave 5 was conducted between 15 March 2008 and 05 April 2008, and the wave 6
between 01 March 2012 and 30 April 2012.
We can see in table 7 the availability of data for several Arab countries in the waves 5 and
6. We also add Turkey even if it is not an Arab country for the religion, geographical and
historical similarities. We can see that we have the data simultaneity before and after Arab
revolutions only for five countries: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco and Turkey.
For the first part of the study concerning the determinants of preferences for redistribution
in Egypt, we rely on the data available for Egypt in the waves 5 and 6. We also test the effects
of these factors on demand for redistribution for other Arab countries in order to help us to
explain the results we find for Egypt. For the second part of the study concerning the effect
of the Egyptian revolution on demand for redistribution in Egypt, we are relying on the data
collected for Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Turkey for the same period.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
In tables 1, 8, 9 and 10, we represent some information about the main individual characteris-
tics of the individuals in the sample before and after January 2011 for Egypt, Jordan, Turkey
and Morocco, as well as the financial situation and the attitudinal variables. In table 1, the first
three columns refer to the period before the revolution for Egypt (at the beginning of 2008)
and the three last columns refer to the period after the revolution for Egypt (14 months after
the revolution). The last column in table 1 refers to the maximum value of the correspondent
variable, besides the binary variables the minimum value is always 1. The same design is made
for Jordan, Morocco and Turkey with different fieldwork periods. More details can be found in
Appendix A.
The size of the samples is between 1000 and 1500, except the 2008 sample for Egypt which
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Table 1: Summary statistics : Egypt
Egypt
Before Revolution
(15-03-2008 - 05-04-2008)
After Revolution
(01-03-2012 - 30-04-2012)
Mean Sd N Mean Sd N Max
Pref for redistribution 2.39 1.3 2988 3.57 1.53 1477 5
Individual characteristics
Age 2.47 0.9 3028 2.48 0.94 1477 4
Woman 0.617 0.48 3028 0.68 0.46 1477 1
Education level 1.91 1.05 2966 1.96 1.10 1378 4
Having Children 0.82 0.38 3028 0.63 0.48 1477 1
Current Welfare
Financial situation 2.70 1.248 3027 2.75 1.30 1477 5
Attitudinal variables
Ideological position 1.67 0.73 2707 2.25 0.70 1477 3
Attend Religious activities 0.47 0.49 3025 0.38 0.48 1477 1
Aversion to risk 1.47 0.73 3003 1.86 0.78 1477 3
Social trust 2.87 1.26 2989 3.02 1.12 1477 5
Importance of helping 2.64 0.56 3022 2.63 2.63 1477 3
Altruism to Children 0.52 0.49 3028 0.29 0.45 1477 1
Having control (Effort role) 2.1863 0.814 3022 2.33 0.815 1477 3
Being interested in politics 1.97 0.95 3024 2.88 0.96 1477 4
is 3000 individuals. Some variables are missing in some samples which we will take into account
our analysis. Concerning the individual characteristics variables across countries before 2011,
one notes that they have fairly close means except for the number of womans where is quite
highly in Egypt.
Our summary statistics suggest that the individual characteristics remain relatively stable
between periods, except for who have one child or more for Egypt and Jordan, which is smaller
in Egypt and more prominent in Jordan in wave 6 compared to wave 5. The summary statistics
also indicate that the financial situation on average did not change in Egypt between 2008 and
2012, increased in Jordan and Morocco, and slightly increased in Turkey. For the attitudinal
variables, some variables means changed considerably in all countries. In Egypt, Individuals
became in average more in right ideologically, a little less religious, more risk-averse, more be-
lieving that they have control on their life, and much more interested in Politics. In Jordan,
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Individuals became on average less risk-averse, less trustful in society. In Turkey, the Individ-
uals became in average more in right politically, slightly more averse to risk, more trustful in
society, more interested in politics. In Morocco, Individuals became on average more trustful
in society, less believing that they have control on their life, a little more interested in Politics.
We can draw for this changes, that Egypt experienced more changes than the other countries,
and especially at the level of the degree of interest in politics compared to the other countries
as we can in figures 2 and 4. The number of individuals interested in politics has increased
enormously in 2012. The different trajectories concerning the evolution of these variables in
the time, show the need to take control for these variables in the coming sections.
Table 2: Percentages of individuals who are favorable for redistribution before and after January 2011
in the four countries
% Individuals favorable for redistribution
2007-2008 2011-2012
Egypt 22% 59%
Jordan 25% 12%
Morocco 36% 40%
Turkey 49% 55%
We focus now on our explained variable, the one indicating namely the individual preference
for redistribution. We rely on this following question in the survey: " I’d like you to tell
me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means
you agree completely with the statement on the left (Incomes should be made more equal)
; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right (We need larger income
differences as incentives for individual effort); and if your views fall somewhere in between,
you can choose any number in between". Responses were coded on a scale of 1 through 5,
with 5 representing being very favorable to the statement "Incomes should be made more
equal" (i.e. More favorable to redistribution). This variable was used many times to measure
support for redistribution (Murthi and Tiongson, 2008; Shayo, 2009; Klor and Shayo, 2010).
As we can see in Figure 1, the distribution of the individuals over the choices concerning
the demand for redistribution, changed drastically after the revolution : based on these data,
21.65% of the Egyptian population was in favor of the redistribution in 2008 (responded 4
or 5), this percentage rose to 59.31% in 2012. If we look at figure 3 to the evolution of this
percentage in Morocco and Turkey, we found that there was a slight increase, especially if we
look to the means of this variable in these two countries. In Jordan, the mean of the demand
for redistribution decreased very slightly in 2014, even if the number of individuals declaring
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support for redistribution decreased strongly (from 25% to 12%). We draw from all of this, the
importance of studying more deeply this phenomenon by an econometric approach.
4 Empirical strategy
Since no study has been done on Arab countries generally and on Egypt specifically in the field
of demand for redistribution, the first stage of our empirical strategy is to study the effects of
the traditional factors we explored in the Section 3 that might have an effect on the preferences
for redistribution in Egypt according to the studies already done on the subject. We compare
the results we obtained with those concerning the other Arab countries when it is necessary.
It is insightful to do so to validate what is consistent and at the same time pointing out the
results which seem to be in contradiction with the current literature.
We assume that the demand for redistribution if individual i living at time t can be char-
acterized by a latent variable y∗it. Since we have a discrete ordinal dependent variable, we are
using ordered logit model (We assuming a logistic redistribution for the error term). Standard
errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. In Section 1, we use the function 1 to estimate the
parameters :
y∗it = η.Iit + β.Sit + γ.Ait + ζ.R + εit (1)
y∗it is the "latent variable" presenting the preference for redistribution for an individual i
living in a year t; Iit is a vector of the financial situation; Sit is a vector of the individual
characteristics; Ait is a vector of the personal social attitudes; W is a wave dummy; and εit is
an error term. η, β, γ and ζ are parameters.
We do not observe y∗it but a variable yit taking values 1 to 5 increasing in individual demand
for redistribution. We have
yit = m if αm−1 < y∗it < αm for m = 1, ..., 5
Where α1 , α2 , α3, α4 are the unknown cut points.
We begin by to assess the sign and significance of the vectors of the coefficients related to
the determinants of preferences. Section 5.1 describes the results of this procedure.
The second phase of the analysis consists of studying the effect of the revolution. Given
that the Egyptian revolution is the major event that occurred between 2008 and 2012, it can
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be hypothesized that, at least partially, this is what the dummy year is capturing. In first we
use the function 1 to evaluate the sign and the significance of ζ the coefficient capturing the
effect of time, which is here the effect of the revolution. In second, we move to study the effect
of the revolution in Egypt but this time we include a control group, which is not affected by
the revolution, and therefore make a difference in difference. In order to do this, we use the two
waves data for the four countries: Egypt, Turkey, Jordan and Morocco. To estimate the effect
of the revolution on the Egyptian people in this case we use the function 2 where the demand
for redistribution of individual i living in the country c at period t can be characterized by a
"latent variable" :
y∗ict = β1.Iict + β2.Sict + β3.Aict + β4.R + β5.E + β6.W.E + εict (2)
E is a country dummy equal to 1 if the individual lives in Egypt and 0 if he is living oth-
erwise; W.E represents the interaction between W and E. β6 is the difference-in-difference
estimator. We conduct robustness checks using two waves before the revolution instead of 1.
Finally, we are interested in estimating the differential effect of the revolution on the different
socio-economic and attitudinal groups in Egypt by adding the interactions between these groups
and the period dummy W. We use the function 3 :
y∗it = γ1.Iit + γ2.Sit + γ3.Ait + γ4.W + γ5W.Iit + γ6W.Sit + γ7W.Ait + εit (3)
Where γ5, γ6 and γ7 are parameters for interaction groups.
5 Results
5.1 Determinants of preferences for redistribution in Egypt
Individual characteristics
We start our analysis by examining the effect of some individual characteristics on support
for redistribution in Egypt . In the existing literature, the older the individual is, the less he
is likely to support redistribution (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Alesina and Giuliano, 2009;
Busemeyer, 2013). Alesina and Giuliano (2009) found an inverted U curve effect, the demand
for redistribution decline in advanced stages of the life-cycles. In the tables 12,13 and 14, we
found that the younger people are less favorable to redistribution compared to others, especially
compared to the older individuals where the effect is significant.
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Across regressions, we see that being female enhance the desire for redistribution which is
consistent with what can be found in the literature (Alesina and Giuliano (2009)).
For the education level, we find that being illiterate or having a very low education level
increase the demand for redistribution compared to others (Alesina and Giuliano (2009)). Fi-
nally having a child or more, yields no significant effect once controlled by the financial situation
(Neher (2011)).
Financial situation
A large body of empirical evidence shows that the financial situation is one of the most im-
portant determinants. The richer a person is, the more he is supposed to be favorable to
redistribution (Corneo and Grüner, 2002; Guillaud, 2013). In all columns in table 12 and 13
and 14 we see that individuals living in a good or very good financial situation are much less
favorable to the redistribution compared to those living in a bad financial situation.2
Health situation
Being in bad health means more health-related expenses, and puts individuals in a risky situa-
tion regarding their future. Therefore this variable can be a proxy for the risk exposure. These
elements push individuals to be more favorable to redistribution (Olivera (2015)), which we
found in table 13 (column 1).
Ideological position
In column 2 in table 13, we add an important variable in the literature, the ideological po-
sitioning (left-center-right). Being leftist enhance the demand for redistribution compared to
those being rightist even if we control it with the financial situation (Busemeyer (2013), Pittau,
Farcomeni, and Zelli (2016)).
Reciprocity (Trust)
We include the variable stating if the individual thinks that the most people can be trusted as
a proxy for the reciprocity attitude of the individual. Trusting others will push the individual
to think that others will not take something is not their right legally and therefore being more
favorable to redistribution compared to those having the opposite attitude (Fong, 2001; Fatica,
2Variable Financial sit : the felt familial financial situation. 1: Very bad 5: Very good. We have tried two
other variables of the financial situation and we had the same results.
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2011). The column 3 of table 13, shows that, as expected, that trusting other yields a significant
and strong positive effect.
Religion
In column 4, we talk about being an active participant in religious activities. In the literature,
religious people compared to others are less favorable to the redistribution, one of the expla-
nations are that religious people profit more from the services provided by religious helping
networks (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011; Neustadt, 2011). In our study, attending religious activ-
ities has the opposite effect, the coefficient is positive. One of the explanations remains in the
fact that Egyptian society is a very religious one, so we do not have this community effect we
can find in the developed countries. Therefore another component of being religious appears,
which is the religious education focusing on the importance of asceticism and altruism. In this
case, we can understand why the religious persons tend to be more favorable to redistribution.
One has to underline we find the same positive effect in many other Arab countries (table
45,46,47) like Algeria, Iraq (significant), Bahrain, Morocco, Lebanon (significant).
Risk aversion
We also study the effect of the risk attitude, Beck (1994) run an experimental study and found
how risk aversion can make the individual more favorable to the redistribution based on an
"insurance motive". Rehm (2009) explains by an empirical study how a risky job (where the
percentage of unemployment is high) has a positive effect on the demand for redistribution,
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) use proxies like self-employment, that yields a negative effect.
In this study, we use individual answers to a question that would elicit the aversion risk: "Is it
important to this person adventure and taking risks? 1: Very much like me; 6: Not at all like
me. We re-coded it in an increasing way that 1 represents the risk-averse individuals, and the
3 the risk-seeking individuals. We see in column 5 in table 13 that the coefficients are negative
which is why it is expected, but the coefficients are insignificant. We tried to study the effect
of the risk attitude by taking the institution occupation (if the individual is self-employment or
working in public sector or public sector) but only for the wave 6 since we do not have this data
for the two waves: the effect still insignificant. We explain this insignificant effect by the fact
that the labor market structure is very different in Egypt compared to the developed countries,
being in a public institution may do not offer the same insurance that offers the same position
in the developed countries. 3 If we look at the tables 39, 40 and 41, only in Turkey and Iran
we have a significant negative coefficient.
3, For example, a big part of the Egyptian people still lives in rural areas, where most of the jobs are
considered as self-employment.
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Altruism
To test the effect of altruism, we use a proxy indicates if the individual finds that the unselfish-
ness is an important quality for a child, and another proxy indicates if the person thinks that
is it important to help people. In the literature, being altruistic has a positive effect Alesina
and La Ferrara (2005). We find in column 1 and 2 of table 14 that for the two proxies, being
altruistic has a negative effect and it is very significant. The reason these variable yields the
opposite effect, maybe yields in the fact that in a society like the Egyptian one, having an altru-
istic attitude, reflects that this person is living in an altruistic environment where individuals
are less dependent on state help. Indeed, an altruistic behavior in some societies (especially
in a rural society like Egypt4) may reveal a closer social life, where in the case of a financial
problem, the individual will in first place ask his entourage for help. Karshenas et al. (2014)
explained how in the Arab countries residual forms of social transfers based on the ethnic and
religious groups cover the needs not covered by the social state. In other countries like OECD
countries or the United-States (countries where most studies have been done), we are talking
about different types of society where the requested help is –very often– addressed to the State.
If we look to the effect of these variables in other Arab countries (tables 51,52,53,54,55 and 56),
we find that the first proxy coefficient is negative and significant in Iraq, Lebanon and Tunisia
like in Egypt. We found a positive significant coefficient only in Yemen and Jordan. For the
second proxy only in Tunisia, we found a positive effect of being altruism. Which indicates
that the explanation of this result lies in something specific to the Arab social structure.
Role of effort : Autonomy freedom
In column 4 in table 13, we add an important factor considered as one of the most influential
determinants of the preferences for redistribution: the belief about the role of effort and chance
in determining the success in life. In literature, the more the respondent believes the effort is
essential, the more he is against the redistribution compared to the respondent who believes
luck is more important. It is also called the fairness attitude. The explanation behind it is that
if the effort is what determines our success in life, there is no need anymore for the incomes
to be equal : if the individual is in a bad situation, then that is the result of what he sowed
(Piketty, 1995; Fong, 2001; Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000) .In our study we take as a proxy for
this attitude, the following question: "How much freedom of choice and control you feel you
have over the way your life turns out". In fact, if individuals consider that they have control on
their life, they will be more able to accept their financial situation as a result of their effort, and
456% of the population are living in rural areas.
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then less favorable to redistribution. In the last column, we find the expected result: the effect
is negative, significant and progressive. We found the same result in almost all Arab countries
(table 57,58,59).
5.2 The effect of the revolution
Like we stated in the third Section, the distribution of the respondents over the demand for
redistribution has changed drastically. To estimate and quantify the effect of this revolution
correctly, we control this effect in first for the classical determinants of demand for redistribu-
tion within the Egyptian people, and in second for the effect of time that concerns the Arab
world generally. We are interested also to see if we have differential revolution effect by groups
we choose.
To estimate the effect of revolution, we estimate the effect of time, the effect of living after
January 2011 (2012 for Egypt) compared to living before January 2011 (2008 for Egypt). The
variable "After revolution" represents a dummy where after=1 if the respondent was questioned
in the wave 6 and after=0 if the respondent was questioned in the wave 5.
Table 12, 13 and 14 represent the results we obtain by estimating the effect of the Egyptian
revolution on demand for redistribution in Egypt adding variables one by one. The variables we
add are the same we The baseline estimate (Column [1]), without any controls, shows that on
average, living in 2012 is associated with a 0.296 increase in the probability of identifying as very
favorable to redistribution and a 0.0183 decrease in identifying as very unfavorable compared
with an individual living in 2008. This effect is still significant, very strong and having nearly
the same marginal effects after the introduction of each of the variables. We can conclude that
changes in individual characteristics, financial situation and the attitude variables, are not able
to explain the shift in the redistributive support after the revolution.
Robustness : Diff-in-Diff analysis
Is the effect of time peculiar to Egypt to say that it was the revolution that caused this change?
Or is we can find the same effect for all Arab countries? To answer this question, we rely on
the data of Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Turkey. These countries are quite close at the political
and economic level, which provide us a very good control group, and therefore allow us to take
into account the parallel trend.
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In first we run the regression following the function 1 for each of these four countries (ta-
ble 15), and we calculate the marginal effects (table 16). We found that the effect of time
in the other countries is very significant. However, once we look at the marginal effects, we
notice the immense difference between the values of Egypt and those of other countries. For
example, the probability of being very favorable to redistribution in Egypt in 2008 compared
to 2012 is 26.8% higher, only 4.5% higher in Jordan, 4.3% in Morocco and 5.5% in Turkey.
This means that to obtain the proper effect of the Egyptian revolution, it will be necessary to
isolate the effect of time which affects all countries in consideration. These positive effects of
coefficients of time variable indicate that there is a tendency towards more redistribution in the
Arab Zone. One of the explanations is that the Arab Spring has touched the majority of the
countries slightly even if there was no revolution. The second explanation is that between 2008
and 2012, there was more openness to the international due to the development of the level of
education and access to the Internet, and then better information on the situation of inequality.
To obtain the proper effect of the revolution, we calculate the diff-in-diff estimator repre-
senting the proper effect of time concerning Egypt based on the function 2. The diff-in-diff
estimator is obtained by the interaction between the dummy variable equal to 1 if individual
lives in Egypt and 0 otherwise and the number of the wave as we can see in table 17 and 18. We
are looking for the diff-in-diff estimators by taking each time Egypt with one of the countries
alone. Even if is the magnitude of the coefficient became smaller, as we can see in the table,
the diff-in-diff estimator is very significant and remains strong in any case. In table 18, we can
see the coefficient of the diff-in-diff estimator, taking as a control group this time the three
countries together. The coefficient is very significant and big. We conclude that even if there is
a part of the effect of time is unspecific to Egypt, the effect of the revolution remains very strong.
The second placebo test consists of comparing the effect of time between the waves 5 and 6
to the one we obtain between the waves 4 and 5. Between 2001 and 2008, there was no revolu-
tion, the expected result for the effect of time is to have a marginal effect small enough to be
compared to that of the period of the revolution. We run the same regression we did (function
1) for the wave 4 and 5. The coefficient is very significant: being in 2008 has a positive effect on
the support for redistribution compared to being in 2001 (Table 19). However, we calculate the
marginal effects (Table 20), and we found that probabilities of being very favorable or favorable
for more redistribution are very different between those of 2008-2012 and those of 2000-2008.
It is 11.6% between 2000 and 2008, and 30.3% between 2008 and 2012. While taking into
consideration that we do not have the same duration between these periods. The probabilities
of being very unfavorable or unfavorable for more redistribution (or more precisely favorable to
the idea we need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort) are also different
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to those of 2008-2012. There is 18% less chance that an individual takes this position in 2008
compared to 2000, this percentage is 35,5% in 2012 compared to 2008.
Heterogeneous treatment effects
In this extension we want to shed light on which groups have the most forceful response to the
revolution. We test this differential effect on each one of the variables we tested. We found that
the heterogeneous effect exists only over the financial situation groups, over the health situation
groups, and over the degree of interest in politics groups. We start by testing the effect of time
proper to Egypt (effect of revolution) on the support for redistribution over the financial situa-
tion groups. In table 21 we estimate the equation (3), where we interact the financial situation
index with wave change. The analysis indicates, relative to the lowest financial situation group,
that the effect of the revolution becomes smaller and smaller each time the financial situation
is better.
To obtain the marginal effects concerning every financial situation group, we re-estimate
the equation (1) separately for each group. Like we find in table 22, the heterogeneity of the
effect goes in the direction of having a weaker positive effect for the higher financial situation
group compared to the middle and the lower financial situations groups. The probability to be
very favorable increasing after the revolution by 0.349 (marginal effects) for the low financial
situation, by 0.301 for the average financial situation, and by 0.237 for the high financial sit-
uation. In turn, suggesting that the revolution increased the gap in demand for redistribution
across wealth groups. One potential explanation for these heterogeneous effects could be that
the revolution, was more concerning the low and medium category than the high category, like
the spreading of ideas about social inequality.
In column 2 in table 21, we include the interaction between the number of the wave and
the health situation. We conclude that the effect of the revolution differs significantly between
individuals having good health and those having bad health: the positive effect of the revolution
on demand for redistribution affected much more the people in poor health than the people in
good health. Insofar as the state of health is one of the components of well-being as the finan-
cial situation, this result joined the previous one. This variable also reflects a part of the risk
exposure: A lousy health exposes the individual’s future to more risk compared to healthy ones.
In table 22, we include in column 1 the interaction between the number of wage (date of
survey) and the categorical variable indicating the degree of interest in politics the individual
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gives. We found that the individuals who are very interested in politics were impacted posi-
tively by the revolution on those preferences for redistribution much more than individuals not
interested at all in politics. This result shows that a part of the positive revolution effect of the
revolution lies in the considerable change in the new political scene after the revolution that
we explained in Section 2. We add in column 2 in the same table the interaction between the
number of wave and effect and the individual age group. The youngest category seems to be
the less group infected by the positive effect of the revolution on demand for redistribution,
even if these coefficients are weakly significant.
After all these regressions, we can conclude that the 25 January revolution had an enormous
effect on the demand for redistribution in Egypt. Our results concerning the interactions and
what changed as a result of the revolution can help us explain this effect. The fact that the most
unfortunate individuals were more affected than the richest prove that the new political offer
was relying effectively on what touches more this group, namely for example inequality and
social justice. The fact that the most interested individuals in politics were the most affected
by this positive effect prove that the improvement of the freedom situation was an essential part
of this positive effect: the most interested in politics benefited the most from this situation.
Admittedly, these arguments cannot in themselves explain the overall effect, we still have a
substantial part not explained that we do not pretend to be able to explain it entirely.
6 Discussion
We showed in Section 5 how we managed to isolate the effect of the political and informational
freedom change, and then emphasized the substantial positive impact of these latter on the
preferences for redistribution. The question that comes naturally is why the revolution had
this strong effect on people’s preferences concerning redistribution? How can a change in the
political sphere along with an improvement of the freedom lead to enhance the support for re-
distribution? By what channels (mediators) could this effect pass? Unfortunately, the limited
set of information in our database limits our ability to dig further to explain this effect, but in
the other side, many elements the literature allows us to set some assumptions in this direction.
Since the revolution is considered as a “shock” (we mean by a shock a major event that
happens all of a sudden), we look first at the literature dealing with the effects of shocks. In
this literature the shocks (we mean by a shock a major event that happens all of a sudden)
that were explored in the context of the demand for redistribution are in the vast majority eco-
nomic shocks, especially the recent economic crises that have hit the European countries and
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the United states (Margalit, 2013; Olivera, 2014; Kroeger, 2014).5 In our case, this shock does
not seem to have economic consequences: Section 3 has established that the basic economic
indicators up to the eve of the revolution were not deteriorating, and that after revolution
based on data that we study, the composition of individuals concerning the economic situation
was the same. It is also shown in the regressions that the perception of the economic situation
did not explain this change. Once the possibility that the revolution is an economic shock has
been ruled out, it remains to be known what kind of shock is more like the revolution. We will
use all that we have discussed in Section 3 about the Egyptian revolution to propose our own
hypothesis on the subject.
As explained in Section 3, in first individual freedoms have undergone a major change mainly
regarding freedom of information through the evolution of the role of the Internet and the high
flow of news that has been exposed to the Egyptians. The other change was at the level of po-
litical life, Egyptians experienced the emergence of a new political class from elections deemed
free and with a very high participation rate. Schläpfer, Schmitt, and Roschewitz (2008) showed
how the preferences of citizens could be influenced by political institutions and especially by
party programs, Ford (2016) explains in turn how moral narratives adopted by political and
media elites can manipulate the individual perceptions about welfare. We then have a people
after the revolution that is very interested in politics, which is facing a new political discourse
inspired by the revolution whose term of social justice was one of the central themes, and which
has new sources of information. All of this leads us to believe that the shock that the revolu-
tion caused was an "information" shock that largely targets the economic reality of the country.
In fact, Individual perceptions of the personal or general economic situation may be sub-
ject to many misconceptions. Hauser and Norton (2017) and Kuziemko, Norton, Saez, and
Stantcheva (2015) showed that it exists a substantial difference between the actual levels of in-
equality and the person’s (mis)perception of those levels. The individual’s perceptions of their
equality of opportunity or the future income can also be different from the objective measures
(Alesina and La Ferrara (2005)). Fulfilling this gaps may lead to a correction of the demand
for redistribution attitude: Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz (2013) and Karadja, Mollerstrom,
and Seim (2017) provide evidence on the significant biases in individuals’ evaluations of their
relative position in the income distribution and showed how individuals modify their prefer-
ences as soon as they have the right information. Kuziemko et al. (2015) found a significant
but weak effect on the individuals’ preferences when they learn the actual level of inequality.
Cruces et al. (2013) found that this perception is a statistical inference problem, a reference
5We can find Dahlberg et al. (2012) who studied the effect of the large immigration on the support for
redistribution considered then as a "social" shock.
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group bias. Diermeier, Goecke, Niehues, and Thomas (2017) showed that one of the mispercep-
tions of the level of inequality sources was the media coverage on the perceptions of the level
of inequality not only between Egyptians themselves but compared to the rest of the world.6
In Egypt, it can be supposed that the shock of information allowed the people to have more
correct information about their income position and the level of inequality. A change of the
group inference or a different media coverage can be the source of these perceptions changes.
The unique prove in our study is - as we showed in the heterogeneous effect section - that the
people most interested in politics were more concerned about the positive effect of the revolution
on people’s preferences, which means the new political environment is a part of the explanation.
Other kinds of information different than those cited in the literature may also have an
effect on individuals’ preferences for redistribution. One element that is thought to be inter-
esting and which is induced by the new political discourse is the development of the political
culture on the question of the distributive role of the state. In developed countries where most
of the literature on the demand for redistribution has been made, it is implicitly assumed that
individuals are aware of all the options available to them, including the option of reducing
inequalities through a redistribution of the state from the rich to the poor. Difficult access to
information and a repressive political system for decades, as was the case for Egypt, and for
many other countries in the Middle East, may have the consequence of plunging the country
into a position of ignorance, even of the most fundamental rights. This situation can impose
incomplete preferences, or a bounded rationality, in the sense that the set of choices is more
limited compared to a more democratic society.7 The revolution then allowed people to open
their eyes to new possibilities such as improving the economic situation through less inequality.
7 Conclusion
This document addresses two important issues: the determinants of the support for redistri-
bution in Egypt, and the effect of the Egyptian revolution occurred in 2011 on this support.
In the first part of the results Section, although many of the factors have the expected effects
on demand for redistribution, including the financial situation, some factors stand out. Being
richer, more educated, young, in a bad health, in left decrease the individual demand for redis-
tribution. Attend religious activities enhance the individual support for redistribution contrary
to the classical finding in the literature. An another surprisingly result is the negative effect of
6A big shift in the "reference point" as has been explained by Charité, Fisman, and Kuziemko (2015).
7Hong, Ding, and Yao (2015) showed how unfounded beliefs or the erroneous processing of information could
generate the "irrationality" of individual social welfare preferences
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having an altruistic attitude. Our explanations for these results put the accent on the specific
cultural and social structure of the Egyptian society specially and the Arab one more generally.
The strong presence of religion and the sustenance of alternative forms of social transfers seem
to weigh on the formation of individual attitudes.
The second part of the results deals with the effect of time between 2008 and 2012. Since
the only major event happened between these years was the Egyptian revolution, we suppose
that the effect of time controlled by the appropriate factors is the effect of the revolution. The
Egyptian revolution is not only the event itself but all the consequences that followed. This
study provides compelling evidence of the substantial positive impact of the revolution on in-
dividuals’ preferences for redistribution. It has been shown that none of the factors considered
as determinants of redistribution preference can explain this time effect. A diff-in-diff analysis
also showed that this effect persists even if we control it with the effect of time proper to the
countries we take into account (Jordan, Morocco and Turkey). We also showed that even if
a positive trend existed between 2000 and 2008, the marginal effects are much smaller than
the ones we obtained for the revolution period. This positive effect was mostly homogeneous
between the different individuals, except for those who differ in their financial situation and
their degree of interest in politics : Individuals who feel financially challenged, and who are very
interested in politics have seen their support for redistribution increase more sharply compared
respectively to those in a more comfortable financial situation and the individuals who are not
interested at all in politics.
The limits of this study are numerous. The first one is the difficulty of analyzing a rather
complex and multidimensional phenomenon that a revolution. We do not pretend to be able
to explain everything, we are just interested in a part that we consider to be important in
the process. The second is the control group with which Egypt is compared. Although there
are significant similarities between the countries chosen at the political and economic levels,
the trends over time were not the same, and several non-measurable differences can be hidden
playing a role in the evolution of preferences. The third limitation concerns the limited number
of variables available to explain the preference of the individual. Further information on the
individuals such as their entourage for example, or their attitudes as well as their perceptions
of social inequalities and mobility will have been very useful. The fourth limitation is the lack
of documentation that can help us build the foundation of our assumptions presented about
the mechanisms generating the redistribution attitude evolution as a result of the political and
informational change.
Our work opens a big door for studying the preferences for redistributions intensely for the
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Arab countries: shedding light on the specificities of this environment, especially on all what
can be related to the social transfer and religion. In this paper, we limited our analysis on the
essential of this topic, but much more can be done. Our study also draws the attention to the
importance of the level of freedom and the political institutions on the formation of individuals
support for redistribution. This theme is gaining in importance since the deteriorating of the
state of democracy in the world as mentioned in the report named "Democracy in crisis" by
Freedom House (2018). The factor of freedom – in the broader sense of the term – is until now
very little exploited concerning its effect on the individual’s preferences for the redistribution.
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Appendix 1: Description of variables
The following is a list of the variables we use and their sources, followed by summary statistics.
Unless otherwise stated, the source of a variable is author’s calculation on WVS data.
• Pref for redis: Categorical variable varying on a 5 point scale from 1=against distribution
to 5=in favor for redistribution. Original WVS survey question (ppr1 ) : " I’d like you to
tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1
means you agree completely with the statement on the left (Incomes should be made more
equal) ; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right (We need larger
income differences as incentives for individual effort); and if your views fall somewhere in
between, you can choose any number in between". Our variable is rescaled (11-ppr1 ), i.e
it is increasing in individual support for redistribution, and then regrouped in 5 groups
(Ppr).
• Age: Categorical variable presenting 4 categories of age equal to 1 if the age of the
respondent is between 18 and 25, 2 if the age of the respondent is between 26 and 39, 3
if the age of the respondent is between 49 and 59, and 4 if the age of the respondent is
above 59.
• Woman: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is female.
• Education: Categorical variable presenting 4 categories of educational level equal to 1
if the respondent is illiterate, 2 if the respondent has a low level of education (less than
secondary school), 3 if the respondent has a complete secondary school, 4 if the respondent
had a university formation.
• Children: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent has children
• badhealth: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is in a bad or very bad health situation
and equal to 0 otherwise.
• Financial sit: Categorical variable presenting 5 categories of financial situation equal to
1 if the respondent is very dissatisfied with his financial situation, and equal to 5 if the
respondent is very satisfied with his financial situation.
• After Revolution: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is living in 2008 and to 0 if the
respondent is living in 2012.
• Trust: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that most people can be trusted and
equal to 0 if the respondent thinks that we can not be too careful. This is a proxy for the
reciprocity attitude.
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• Politic ideo: Categorical variable presenting 3 categories of the ideological position be-
tween left and right equal to 1 if the respondent is considering himself having a left
ideological position, 2 if the respondent is considering himself in the middle (between
these 2 positions), and 3 if the respondent is considering himself having a right ideologi-
cal position. (The variable is coded in the database in the scale of 10: 1 for left and 10
for right).
• Religious: Categorical variable presenting 2 categories of how often the individual attend
religious services, it is equal to 1 if the respondent attends religious services once a week
or more, and 0 if otherwise.
• Risk attitude: Categorical variable presenting 3 categories of how important it is to take
risks. It is a proxy for the risk attitude. It is taking the value of 1 if the respondent likes
to take risks instead, the value of 3 if the respondent doesn’t like to take risks instead,
and the value of 2 if the respondent is in between these 2 positions.
• Imp of Help: Categorical variable presenting 3 categories on the subject of how it is
important to help the people nearby. It is considering as a proxy for the altruism attitude.
This variable is equal to 1 if the respondent is considering himself as an altruistic, 3 if it
is not, and 2 if he is between these 2 positions.
• childaltruisme: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent think that the unselfishness is an
important quality child. It can also be considered as a proxy for the altruism attitude.
• Interest in Poli: Categorical variable presenting 4 categories on the subject of how the
respondent is interesting in politics, equal to 1 the respondent is not at all interested in
politics, equal to 2 if the respondent is not very interested in politics, to 3 if the respondent
is somewhat interested in politics, to 4 if the respondent is very interested in politics.
• Role of effort: Categorical variable presenting 3 categories on the subject of how much
freedom of choice and control the respondent thinks he has in this life. It can be considered
as a proxy for the fairness beliefs about the effort and chance at the personal level. This
variable is equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that he has no liberty and choice in his life
(so thinks that the effort does not has an effect), 3 he thinks that he has a control in his
life (so thinks that he believes in effort more than luck), and 2 if he is between these 2
positions.
• Group of variables A: age, gender, education level, having children, financial situation,
being in a bad health, political ideology, attend religious services, trust others, altruism
attitude, being interested in politics, the perception of the role of effort in one’s own life.
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• Group of variables B: age, gender, education level, having children and financial situation.
• Group of variables C: Age, Woman, Children, Finan sit, badhealth, trust people, childal-
truisme, Interest in Poli and Role of effort..
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Appendix 2 : Informations concerning the Freedom, political and eco-
nomic situations in Egypt
Table 3: Some components of freedom situation in Egypt between 2008 and 2012
Freedom in Egypt 2008 2009 2011 2012
1. Association, Assembly & Civil Society 3.6 3.6 5.8 5.8
i. Freedom of Association 2.5 2.5 5.0 5.0
ii. Freedom of Assembly and Demonstration 2.5 2.5 7.5 7.5
iii. Autonomy of Organisations 4.4 4.4 4.2 4.2
iv. Freedom to Establish Organisations 5.0 5.0 6.7 6.7
2. Expression & Information 5.6 5.6 6.3 6.3
i. Press kilings 10.0 10.0 7.5 8.8
ii. Laws and regulation that influence media content 3.0 3.0 3.3 2.7
iii. Political pressures and controls on media content 4.8 4.8 4.5 4.0
iv. Freedom of access to Foreign information 6.7 6.7 8.8 4.0
v. State control over internet access 3.3 3.3 7.5 7.5
Source : The Human Freedom Index (HFI) Egypt (2016 report).
Table 4: Some economic indicators for Egypt between 2004 and 2012
Indicators 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP Growth (%) 4.09 4.47 6.85 7.09 7.15 4.67 5.14 1.78 2.16
Gini indicator 31.9 - - - 31.5 - 31.5 - 31.5
HDI - 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.68
Table 5: Voter turnout for some elections in Egypt between 2005 and 2012
Elections 2005 2010 2011 2012
Presidential 22.95% - - 51.85%
Parlimentary 28.13% 27.47% 62.04% -
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Table 6: Summary of the 2011 election for People’s Assembly of Egypt
Party ComponentParties
Date of
fondation Vote % Total seats % Seats
Democratic Alliance
for Egypt
Freedom & Justice
Party: 213 2011 37.5 235 46.26
Dignity Party: 6 1996
Ghad,El-Thawra
Party: 2 2011
Civilization,Party: 2 2011
Islamic,Labour
Party: 1 1998
Egyptian Arab
Socialist Party: 1 1977
Egyptian
Reform Party: 1 2011
Affiliated
Independents 9
Islamist Bloc Al-NourParty: 107 2011 27.8 121 23.82
Building&
Development Party: 13 2011
Authenticity Party: 3 2011
New Wafd Party 1978 9.2 41 8.07
Egyptian Bloc Social DemocraticParty: 16 2011 8.9 35 6.89
Free Egyptians
Party: 15 2011
Progressive
Unionist Party: 4 1977
Al-Wasat Party 1996 3.7 10 1.97
The Revolution
Continues Alliance
Socialist Popular
Alliance Party: 7 2011 2.8 9 1.77
Freedom Egypt Party: 1 2011
Equality &
Development Party: 1 2011
Reform and Development
Party 2009 2.2 9 1.77
Freedom Party 2011 1.9 4 0.79
National Party of Egypt 2011 1.6 5 0.98
Egyptian Citizen Party 2011 0.9 4 0.79
Union Party 2011 0.5 2 0.39
Conservative Party 2006 1.0 1 0.2
Democratic Peace Party 2005 0.9 1 0.2
Justice Party 2011 0.7 1 0.2
Arab Egyptian Unity Party 2011 0.6 1 0.2
Nasserist Party 1992 0.6 1 0.2
Independents - - 21 0.2
Total elected 489 4.13
SCAF appointees 10
Total 508
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Appendix 3: Summary statistics
Table 7: Availability of Data by wave for some countries
Topic Wave 5 Wave 6
Algeria No Yes
Egypt Yes Yes
Iraq Yes Yes
Jordan Yes Yes
Kuwait No Yes
Lebanon No Yes
Libya No Yes
Morocco Yes Yes
Palestine No Yes
Qatar No Yes
Tunisia No Yes
Turkey Yes Yes
Yemen No Yes
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Table 8: Summary statistics : Jordan
Jordan
Before Revolution
(01-05-2007 - 30-06-2007)
After Revolution
(19-02-2014 - 01-03-2014)
Mean Sd N Mean Sd N Max
Pref for redistribution 2.27 1.62 1101 2.19 1.15 1127 5
Individual characteristics
Age 2.28 0.9 1159 2.44 0.92 1130 4
Woman 0.51 0.5 1159 0.51 0.49 1130 1
Education level 2.37 1.07 1067 2.16 1.12 1120 4
Having Children 0.68 0.46 1159 0.76 0.42 1128 1
Current Welfare
Financial situation 3.44 1.3 1149 2.93 1.15 1130 5
Attitudinal variables
Ideological position 2.06 0.845 318 - - - 3
Attend Religious activities - - - 0.52 0.49 1130 1
Aversion to risque 2.41 0.63 1122 1.94 0.87 1125 3
Social trust 3.44 1.57 1141 3.02 1.48 1125 5
Importance of helping 2.86 0.35 1132 2.78 0.46 1125 3
Altruism to Children 0.55 0.49 1159 0.36 0.48 1130 1
Having control (Effort role) 2.61 0.68 1148 2.58 0.64 1130 3
Being interested in politics 2.18 0.98 1151 2.14 0.96 1130 4
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Table 9: Summary statistics : Turkey
Turkey
Before Revolution
(28-01-2007 - 05-03-2007)
After Revolution
(30-06-2012 - 25-08-2012)
Mean Sd N Mean Sd N Max
Pref for redistribution 3.27 1.46 1267 3.4 1.29 1523 5
Individual characteristics
Age 2.26 0.88 1293 2.33 0.89 1559 4
Woman 0.49 0.5 1293 0.517 0.49 1559 1
Education level 2.11 1.13 1186 2.24 1.14 1557 4
Having Children 0.66 0.47 1292 0.64 0.47 1559 1
Current Welfare
Financial situation 3.25 1.04 1288 3.38 1.01 1539 5
Attitudinal variables
Ideological position 2.18 0.80 1293 2.24 0.78 1411 3
Attend Religious activities 0.34 0.47 1100 0.3 0.46 1536 1
Aversion to risque 1.85 0.81 1286 2.04 0.78 1527 3
Social trust 2.62 1.25 1251 3.08 1.21 1543 5
Importance of helping 2.71 0.51 1264 - - - 3
Altruism to Children 0.31 0.46 1293 0.28 0.45 1559 1
Having control (Effort role) 2.56 0.71 1270 2.62 0.87 1540 3
Being interested in politics 2.15 0.97 1290 2.44 0.63 1545 4
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Table 10: Summary statistics : Morroco
Morroco
Before Revolution
(15-09-2007- 07-10-2007)
After Revolution
(25-05-2011-18-06-2011)
Mean Sd N Mean Sd N Max
Pref for redistribution 3.06 1.36 1157 3.18 1.43 842 5
Individual characteristics
Age 2.30 0.87 1178 2.30 0.88 1182 4
Woman 0.50 0.50 1178 0.50 0.50 1882 1
Education level 2.14 1.07 482 1.48 0.88 1882 4
Having Children 0.69 0.45 987 0.59 0.49 1173 1
Current Welfare
Financial situation 2.77 0.96 1177 3.07 1.12 1171 5
Attitudinal variables
Ideological position 2.14 0.61 494 2.06 0.76 206 3
Attend Religious activies 0.91 0.28 1168 - - - 1
Aversion to risque 1.91 0.81 1125 1.84 0.76 1022 3
Social trust 2.21 1.17 1152 2.67 1.22 1096 5
Importance of helping 2.59 0.56 1153 2.56 0.58 1084 3
Altruism to Children 0.36 0.48 1178 0.25 0.43 1182 1
Having control (Effort role) 1.97 0.82 1163 1.63 0.71 1038 3
Being interested in politics 2.05 0.97 1097 2.22 0.81 1142 4
37
Figure 3: Preferences for redistribution before and after January 2011 : Jordan, Morocco, and Turkey
Table 11: Percentages of individuals who are favorable to redistribution before and after 2011
% Individuals favorable for redistribution
2007-2008 2011-2014
Egypt 22% 59%
Jordan 25% 12%
Morocco 36% 40%
Turkey 49% 55%
Algeria - 22%
Iraq 39% 38%
Kuwait - 23%
Lebanon - 30%
Libya - 22%
Palestine - 26%
Qatar - 18%
Tunisia - 22%
Yemen - 25%
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Annexe 4 : Regression Tables: Determinants for redistribution
and Effect of revolution in Egypt
Table 12: Determinants of preferences for redistribution and Effect of time in Egypt 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pref for redi Pref for redi Pref for redi Pref for redi Pref for redi Pref for redi
Pref for redis
After revolution 1.497∗∗∗ 1.499∗∗∗ 1.491∗∗∗ 1.498∗∗∗ 1.482∗∗∗ 1.535∗∗∗
Age=1 0 0 0 0 0
Age=2 0.160∗ 0.167∗∗ 0.129 0.168∗ 0.125
Age=3 0.136 0.158∗ 0.0454 0.0908 0.0682
Age=4 0.333∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗
Woman 0.147∗∗∗ 0.0946 0.104∗ 0.143∗∗
Education=1 0 0 0
Education=2 −0.260∗∗∗ −0.262∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗
Education=3 −0.211∗∗ −0.210∗∗ −0.191∗∗
Education=4 −0.300∗∗∗ −0.306∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗
Children −0.0986 −0.103
Finan sit=1 0
Finan sit=2 0.199∗∗
Finan sit=3 0.0823
Finan sit=4 −0.492∗∗∗
Finan sit=5 −0.832∗∗∗
Observations 4465 4465 4465 4305 4305 4304
Pseudo R2 0.044 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.056
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 13: Determinants of preferences for redistribution and Effect of time in Egypt 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pref for redis Pref for redis Pref for redis Pref for redis Pref for redis
Pref for redis
After revolution 1.508∗∗∗ 1.639∗∗∗ 1.535∗∗∗ 1.560∗∗∗ 1.547∗∗∗
badhealth 0.244∗∗∗
Politic ideo=1 0
Politic ideo=2 −0.0154
Politic ideo=3 −0.247∗∗∗
Trust people 0.454∗∗∗
Religious 0.245∗∗∗
Risk attitude=1 0
Risk attitude=2 −0.0288
Risk attitude=3 −0.0373
Control variables Group B Group B Group B Group B Group B
Observations 4304 4015 4299 4301 4281
Pseudo R2 0.057 0.062 0.059 0.057 0.056
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Group B : Age, Woman, Education, Children, Finan sit
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Table 14: Determinants of preferences for redistribution and Effect of time in Egypt 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pref for redis Pref for redis Pref for redis Pref for redis
Pref for redis
After revolution 1.537∗∗∗ 1.498∗∗∗ 1.489∗∗∗ 1.590∗∗∗
Imp of Help=1 0
Imp of Help=2 −0.297∗∗
Imp of Help=3 −0.481∗∗∗
childaltruisme −0.183∗∗∗
Interest in Poli=1 0
Interest in Poli=2 0.0152
Interest in Poli=3 −0.204∗∗∗
Interest in Poli=4 0.334∗∗∗
Role of effort=1 0
Role of effort=2 −0.166∗∗
Role of effort=3 −0.533∗∗∗
Control variables Group B Group B Group B Group B
Observations 4300 4304 4301 4300
Pseudo R2 0.057 0.057 0.058 0.061
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Diff-in-Diff analysis
Table 15: Effect of time in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Turkey
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Egypt Jordan Morocco Turkey
Pref for redis
After revolution 1.606∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗
Control variables Group A GroupA Group A Group A
Observations 4003 2124 1809 2274
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.019 0.048 0.011
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Group A : Age, Woman, Education (only for Egypt and Jordan), Children (Except for Morocco),
Finan sit, badhealth, politic ideo (only for Egypt and Turkey), religious (only for Egypt and Turkey),
trust people, childaltrsuime, Interest in Poli, Imp of Help (only for Egypt) and Role of effort.
Table 16: Marginal effects of "After revolution" for each of the four countries
Marginal effects of after=1 (compared to after=0)
Very unfavorable Unfavorable Neither Favorable Very favorable
Egypt -0.274 -0.060 0.032 0.071 0.231
Jordan -0.096 0.012 0.028 0.012 0.045
Morocco -0.033 -0.019 -0.002 0.011 0.043
Turkey -0.030 -0.029 -0.010 0.014 0.055
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Table 17: Diff in Diff : Egypt and each one of the countries
(1) (2) (3)
Egy*Jordan Egy*Morroco Egy*Turkey
Pref for redis
After revolution=0 0 0 0
After revolution=1 0.330∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗
Egypte=0 0 0 0
Egypte=1 0.353∗∗∗ −0.803∗∗∗ −1.448∗∗∗
After revolution=0 × Egypte=0 0 0 0
After revolution=0 × Egypte=1 0 0 0
After revolution=1 × Egypte=0 0 0 0
After revolution=1 × Egypte=1 1.150∗∗∗ 1.348∗∗∗ 1.393∗∗∗
Control variables Group A Group A Group A
Observations 6416 6075 6437
Pseudo R2 0.056 0.059 0.060
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Group A : Age, Woman, Education (only for Egypt and Jordan), Children (Except for Morocco),
Finan sit, badhealth, politic ideo (only for Egypt and Turkey), religious (only for Egypt and Turkey),
trust people, childaltrsuime, Interest in Poli, Imp of Help (only for Egypt) and Role of effort.
Table 18: Diff in Diff : Egypt and the other three countries
(1) (2)
Pref for redis Pref for redis
Pref for redis
After revolution=0 0 0
After revolution=1 0.598∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗
egypte=0 0 0
egypte=1 −0.152∗∗∗ −0.627∗∗∗
After revolution=0 × egypte=0 0
After revolution=0 × egypte=1 0
After revolution=1 × egypte=0 0
After revolution=1 × egypte=1 1.274∗∗∗
Control variables Group C Group C
Observations 10896 10896
Pseudo R2 0.023 0.031
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Group C : Age, Woman, Children, Finan sit, badhealth, trust people, childaltrsuime,
Interest in Poli and Role of effort.
44
Table 19: Effect of time for the periods 2001-2008 and 2008-2012 in Egypt
(1) (2)
2001-2008 2008-2012
Pref for redis
Between 2001 and 2008 1.027∗∗∗
Between 2008 and 2012 1.606∗∗∗
Observations 5664 4003
Pseudo R2 0.046 0.076
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Controls include : Group of variables B except Politic ideo and Imp of Help for the period 2001-2008
Table 20: Marginal effects of the time variable between 2001 and 2008, and between 2008 and 2012
Marginal effects of the time variable
Very unfavorable Unfavorable Neither Favorable Very favorable
2000-2008 -0.227 0.043 0.067 0.053 0.063
2008-2012 -0.274 -0.060 0.032 0.071 0.231
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Annexe 5 : Heterogeneous effects of the revolution in Egypt
Table 21: Differential Effect : Interactions between revolution and financial and health situation
groups
(1) (2)
Pref for redis Pref for redis
Pref for redis
After revolution=0 0 0
After revolution=1 2.259∗∗∗ 1.423∗∗∗
Finan sit=1 0 0
Finan sit=2 0.386∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
Finan sit=3 0.403∗∗∗ 0.174∗
Finan sit=4 −0.00990 −0.313∗∗∗
Finan sit=5 −0.348∗∗ −0.765∗∗∗
After revolution=0 × Finan sit=1 0
After revolution=0 × Finan sit=2 0
After revolution=0 × Finan sit=3 0
After revolution=0 × Finan sit=4 0
After revolution=0 × Finan sit=5 0
After revolution=1 × Finan sit=1 0
After revolution=1 × Finan sit=2 −0.474∗∗
After revolution=1 × Finan sit=3 −0.764∗∗∗
After revolution=1 × Finan sit=4 −0.976∗∗∗
After revolution=1 × Finan sit=5 −1.375∗∗∗
badhealth 0.214∗∗∗
badhealth=0 0
badhealth=1 0.0719
After revolution=0 × badhealth=0 0
After revolution=0 × badhealth=1 0
After revolution=1 × badhealth=0 0
After revolution=1 × badhealth=1 0.489∗∗∗
Observations 4003 4003
Pseudo R2 0.080 0.077
Controls include: Group of variables A.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 22: Effect of revolution in Egypt over the financial situation groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Difficult financial situation Average fin sit Very good fin sit
Pref for redis
After revolution 1.606∗∗∗ 1.944∗∗∗ 1.740∗∗∗ 1.356∗∗∗
Observations 4003 1358 1423 1222
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.102 0.077 0.052
Controls include: Group of variables A.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 23: Differential Effect : Interactions between revolution and degree of interest in politics and
age groups
(1) (2)
Pref for redis Pref for redis
Pref for redis
After revolution=0 0 0
After revolution=1 1.484∗∗∗ 1.302∗∗∗
Interest in Poli=1 0 0
Interest in Poli=2 0.0614 0.0454
Interest in Poli=3 −0.135 −0.138∗
Interest in Poli=4 −0.0631 0.371∗∗∗
After revolution=0 × Interest in Poli=1 0
After revolution=0 × Interest in Poli=2 0
After revolution=0 × Interest in Poli=3 0
After revolution=0 × Interest in Poli=4 0
After revolution=1 × Interest in Poli=1 0
After revolution=1 × Interest in Poli=2 −0.0260
After revolution=1 × Interest in Poli=3 0.0685
After revolution=1 × Interest in Poli=4 0.706∗∗∗
Age=1 0 0
Age=2 0.101 −0.0404
Age=3 0.0190 −0.0936
Age=4 0.144 0.0381
After revolution=0 × Age=1 0
After revolution=0 × Age=2 0
After revolution=0 × Age=3 0
After revolution=0 × Age=4 0
After revolution=1 × Age=1 0
After revolution=1 × Age=2 0.431∗∗
After revolution=1 × Age=3 0.340∗
After revolution=1 × Age=4 0.312
Observations 4003 4003
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.077
Controls include: Group of variables A.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Annexe 6 : Determinants of demand for redistribution in
the Middle east and the North Africa: Comparison
Risk attitude
Table 24: Coefficients regressions for risk attitude 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Egypte Algerie Iran Bahrain
Pref for redis
Risk attitude=1 0 0 0 0
Risk attitude=2 −0.0288 0.561∗∗∗ −0.256∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗
Risk attitude=3 −0.0373 0.448∗∗∗ −0.335∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗
Observations 4281 977 2208 1051
Pseudo R2 0.056 0.029 0.007 0.021
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Controls include: Group of variables B.
Table 25: Coefficients regressions for risk attitude 2
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Maroc Jordanie Lebanon Libya
Pref for redis
Risk attitude=1 0 0 0 0
Risk attitude=2 −0.0908 0.179∗ 0.327∗∗ 0.0181
Risk attitude=3 −0.221 0.116 0.423∗∗∗ −0.116
Observations 1139 2120 1032 1865
Pseudo R2 0.036 0.010 0.011 0.019
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Controls include: Group of variables B.
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Table 26: Coefficients regressions for risk attitude 3
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Palestine Tunisia Yemen Turkey
Pref for redis
Risk attitude=1 0 0 0 0
Risk attitude=2 0.138 0.0715 0.478∗∗∗ −0.309∗∗∗
Risk attitude=3 0.0295 −0.0156 0.256 −0.322∗∗∗
Observations 913 980 828 2615
Pseudo R2 0.012 0.020 0.029 0.010
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Controls include: Group of variables B.
Attend religious services
Table 27: Coefficients regressions for religion 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Egypte Algerie Iraq Iran Bahrain
Pref for redis
Religious 0.245∗∗∗ 0.125 0.184∗∗ 0.00130 0.154
Observations 4301 1042 2782 2113 1053
Pseudo R2 0.057 0.030 0.011 0.005 0.018
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Controls include: Group of variables B.
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Table 28: Coefficients regressions for religion 2
(6) (7) (8) (9)
Maroc Jordanie Lebanon Libya
Pref for redis
Religious 0.334 −0.0606 0.298∗∗∗ −0.110
Observations 356 1115 1053 1753
Pseudo R2 0.073 0.008 0.010 0.020
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Controls include: Group of variables B.
Table 29: Coefficients regressions for religion 3
(10) (11) (12) (13)
Palestine Tunisia Yemen Turkey
Pref for redis
Religious −0.249∗ −0.298∗∗ −0.103 −0.0728
Observations 931 1025 848 2617
Pseudo R2 0.012 0.023 0.026 0.008
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Controls include: Group of variables B.
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Important child qualities: unselfishness (Altruism)
Table 30: Coefficients regressions for child altruisme 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Egypte Algerie Iraq Iran Bahrain
Pref for redis
childaltruisme −0.183∗∗∗ −0.0921 −0.303∗∗∗ 0.0178 0.0817
Observations 4304 1042 3091 2219 1053
Pseudo R2 0.057 0.029 0.012 0.005 0.017
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Controls include: Group of variables B.
Table 31: Coefficients regressions for child altruisme 2
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Maroc Jordanie Lebanon Kuwait Libya
Pref for redis
childaltruisme 0.0662 0.252∗∗∗ −0.391∗∗∗ −0.122 −0.0145
Observations 1192 2133 1053 1129 1928
Pseudo R2 0.033 0.012 0.011 0.016 0.019
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Controls include: Group of variables B.
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Table 32: Coefficients regressions for child altruisme 3
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Palestine Qatar Tunisia Yemen Turkey
Pref for redis
childaltruisme −0.202 −0.0629 −0.350∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.0861
Observations 931 975 1025 864 2664
Pseudo R2 0.012 0.010 0.024 0.029 0.008
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Controls include: Group of variables B.
The importance of helping others (Altruism)
Table 33: Coefficients regressions for help al 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Egypte Algerie Iraq Bahrain
Pref for redis
Imp of Help=1 0 0 0 0
Imp of Help=2 −0.297∗∗ 0.522∗∗ −0.328 0.272
Imp of Help=3 −0.481∗∗∗ 0.0214 0.0576 0.331
Observations 4300 998 1114 1048
Pseudo R2 0.057 0.035 0.017 0.017
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Controls include: Group of variables B.
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Table 34: Coefficients regressions for help al 2
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Maroc Jordanie Lebanon Kuwait Libya
Pref for redis
Imp of Help=1 0 0 0 0 0
Imp of Help=2 −0.145 −0.218 −0.342∗∗ −0.297 −0.321
Imp of Help=3 −0.213 −0.797∗∗ −0.525∗∗∗ −0.438∗ −0.481∗∗
Observations 1173 2121 1039 1105 1895
Pseudo R2 0.036 0.015 0.010 0.017 0.020
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Controls include: Group of variables B.
Table 35: Coefficients regressions for help al 3
(10) (11) (12) (13)
Palestine Tunisia Yemen Turkey
Pref for redis
Imp of Help=1 0 0 0 0
Imp of Help=2 −0.721∗∗ 0.319 0.0221 −0.495
Imp of Help=3 −0.728∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗ −0.800∗∗ −0.516
Observations 915 989 848 1153
Pseudo R2 0.014 0.023 0.036 0.006
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Controls include: Group of variables B.
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Autonomy freedom (Perception of the role of effort)
Table 36: Coefficients regressions for Choice and control (Fairness) 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Egypte Algerie Iraq Iran Bahrain
Pref for redis
Role of effort=1 0 0 0 0 0
Role of effort=2 −0.166∗∗ 0.851∗∗∗ −0.126 −0.236∗ −0.0565
Role of effort=3 −0.533∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗ −0.245∗∗∗ −0.0191 −0.193
Observations 4300 1025 3075 2213 1047
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.036 0.012 0.006 0.017
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Controls include: Group of variables B.
Table 37: Coefficients regressions for Choice and control (Fairness) 2
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Maroc Jordanie Lebanon Kuwait Libya
Pref for redis
Role of effort=1 0 0 0 0 0
Role of effort=2 −1.066∗∗∗ 0.0714 0.294 0.273 −0.159
Role of effort=3 −1.076∗∗∗ −0.493∗∗∗ −0.0576 0.203 −0.331∗∗
Observations 1135 2131 1051 1111 1899
Pseudo R2 0.046 0.017 0.011 0.016 0.021
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Controls include: Group of variables B.
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Table 38: Coefficients regressions for Choice and control (Fairness) 3
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Palestine Qatar Tunisia Yemen Turkey
Pref for redis
Role of effort=1 0 0 0 0 0
Role of effort=2 −0.328 −0.196 −0.908∗∗∗ −0.145 −0.311∗∗
Role of effort=3 −0.235 −0.441∗ −1.226∗∗∗ −0.557∗∗∗ −0.448∗∗∗
Observations 927 975 1011 838 2642
Pseudo R2 0.012 0.011 0.035 0.030 0.010
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Controls include: Group of variables B.
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